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Abstract
Randomness extractors, widely used in classical and quantum cryptography and other fields of
computer science, e.g., derandomization, are functions which generate almost uniform random-
ness from weak sources of randomness. In the quantum setting one must take into account the
quantum side information held by an adversary which might be used to break the security of
the extractor. In the case of seeded extractors the presence of quantum side information has
been extensively studied. For multi-source extractors one can easily see that high conditional
min-entropy is not sufficient to guarantee security against arbitrary side information, even in the
classical case. Hence, the interesting question is under which models of (both quantum and clas-
sical) side information multi-source extractors remain secure. In this work we suggest a natural
model of side information, which we call the Markov model, and prove that any multi-source
extractor remains secure in the presence of quantum side information of this type (albeit with
weaker parameters). This improves on previous results in which more restricted models were
considered or the security of only some types of extractors was shown.
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1 Introduction
Randomness extractors are of great importance in many applications in computer science,
such as derandomization and cryptography. The goal of a randomness extractor is to generate
(almost) uniform randomness from weak sources of randomness. A weak source is usually
modelled as a distribution X over {0, 1}n such that the min-entropy of X is lower bounded
by k: Hmin(X) ≥ k. That is, the source is defined via a probability distribution for which the
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probability of any string x ∈ {0, 1}n is at most 2−k. The idea is then to apply a randomness
extractor to the weak source, such that the output source Y is indistinguishable from a
uniformly random source.
Unfortunately, no deterministic function can extract the randomness from all sources with
a given min-entropy, even for sources with high min-entropy [31, 33]. The most common ways
to avoid this problem are to consider seeded extractors and multi-source extractors. In the
case of seeded extractors one uses an additional truly uniform (but short) and independent
seed, together with the weak source, as the input to the extractor (see, e.g., [15, 37, 33]).
Alternatively, and of special importance in applications where a uniform seed is not
available (e.g., in quantum randomness amplification protocols, see Appendix C), multi-
source randomness extractors can be used. In the multi-source case, instead of starting
with one weak source X, one considers several independent weak sources X1, X2, . . . , Xl
for some l ≥ 2, with Hmin(Xi) ≥ ki for i ∈ [l], as the input to the extractor (see, for
example, [38, 9, 27, 26, 5]).
In all types of extractors the randomness present in the weak sources must be lower
bounded for the extractor to work (i.e., a bound on the min-entropy is given as a promise).
However, this randomness inherently depends on the information one has about the weak
sources, or to put differently, on the side information about the sources. For example,
extractors are widely used for privacy amplification in cryptographic tasks. There, the
starting point is that an adversary holds some side information C about the source such
that the conditional min-entropy is bounded: Hmin(X|C) ≥ k. The extractor is then used
to transform X to a key Y , which should be close to uniform even conditioned on the side
information C. If the extractor fulfils this requirement it is said to be secure.
Depending on the application one can consider adversaries with classical or quantum
side information and ask whether an extractor remains secure even in the presence of such
side information (with slightly weaker parameters). For seeded extractors this question
has been extensively studied. In the presence of classical adversaries the side information
about X can be translated to a decrease in the min-entropy and the extractor remains
secure [17]. In the quantum case, it was further shown in [17] that all one-bit output
extractors remain secure. It is still unknown whether all multi-bit output extractors remain
secure (although the results of [2, 3] goes in this direction1), but several constructions of
seeded extractors with good parameters were shown to work also in the presence of quantum
side information [30, 8, 36, 13].
When considering multi-source extractors things get more complicated, even in the
classical case. To see this, consider any one-bit output two-source extractor and let the
adversary hold as side information the output of the extractor Y = Ext (X1, X2). As this is
just one bit, Hmin (X1|Y ) ≥ k1 − 1 and Hmin (X2|Y ) ≥ k2 − 1. Furthermore, as the sources
are independent even Hmin (X1|Y X2) and Hmin (X2|Y X1) remain high. Nevertheless, the
extractor obviously fails to produce an output which looks uniform given the side information.
In [16] several more examples are given in which a small amount of classical side information
breaks the extractor completely.
This implies that one cannot expect to have multi-source extractors which are secure
against any classical or quantum side information and thus raises the question: under which
assumptions on the structure of the sources and the side information X1· · ·XlC do multi-
1 Note that there is no contradiction between the results of [2, 3] and the famous counter example of a
seeded extractor which breaks in the presence of quantum side information given in [11]; for details
see [2].
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source extractors remain secure even in the presence of C? The main objective of this work
is to answer this question. In particular, we define a natural condition on the sources and the
side information for which all multi-source extractors remain secure in the presence of both
classical and quantum side information, but with an increase in the error of the extractor –
the distance from uniform of the output.
1.1 Results and contributions
Our first contribution is a new definition of a quantum-proof multi-source extractor, which
is simpler than previous proposals [16, 6] and yet sufficient to extract from these models.
The original classical extractor definition requires the sources to be independent, i.e., in the
two-source case one must have I(X1 : X2) = 0, where I(· : ·) denotes the mutual information.
If an adversary is present and holds some side information C, the definition we introduce
requires that the two sources be independent from the point of view of this adversary, i.e.,
I(X1 : X2|C) = 0. This definition is valid for both classical and quantum side information
C. This means that the sources and the side information should form a Markov chain
X1 ↔ C ↔ X2. For the case of more than two sources a similar Markov-type condition can
be defined and we say that the sources and the side information are in the Markov model.
The formal definitions are given in Section 3.
Compared to previous definitions of quantum-proof multi-source extractors, this has
several advantages. Firstly, it is a natural generalization of the original classical extractor
definition and the extension to quantum side information from [16], and it connects to the
model of [6] in the following sense: any function satisfying our definition of a strong2 extractor
is also an extractor in the model of [6] – a more precise comparison to previous work is given
in Section 1.2. Secondly, we consider it much more natural to put a requirement on the
structure of the global state ρX1X2C , instead of describing permissible adversarial strategies
that generate the side information C, as in [16, 6]. Thirdly, Markov chains arise naturally
in certain applications. For example, in realisations of quantum randomness amplification
protocols one can sometimes assume that the devices on which the experiment is being
preformed have a Markov chain structure (for further details see Appendix C).
We also show that extractors in the Markov model can be used to extract randomness
from a larger set of states. We prove that a bound on the smooth min-entropy [29] suffices for
randomness extraction. This can be seen as a robustness property of the model, since in many
applications one can only bound the smooth min-entropy rather than the min-entropy itself.
In addition, we prove that any CPTP map performed on the side information – which might
delete information and thus destroy the Markov property – cannot decrease the security of
an extractor, hence extractors in the Markov model are also extractors for such non-Markov
states3.
Our second contribution is to prove that all extractors (weak and strong) remain secure
in this model, both in the classical and quantum case, albeit with weaker parameters. In the
classical case the proof is pretty trivial and standard (and the result is indeed not surprising).
Nevertheless, as we could not find it anywhere else in the literature, we give it in this work
for completeness and as comparison to the quantum case. More specifically, for classical side
information we prove the following theorem:
2 An extractor is said to be strong in a set of its sources if even conditioned on all the sources in this set
the output cannot be distinguished from uniform (see formal definition in Section 3).
3 This includes, in particular, states constructed according to the model of [6].
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I Theorem 1. Any (k1, . . . , kl, ε)-[strong] l-source extractor is a
(
k1+log 1ε , . . . , kl+log
1
ε , (l+
1)ε
)
-[strong] classical-proof l-source extractor in the Markov model.
The formal definitions of a (strong) l-source extractor and a (strong) classical-proof
l-source extractor are given in Section 3.1. The important thing to note is that for the
extractor to remain secure, the min-entropy of the sources needs to be just log 1ε higher,
where ε is the security parameter (or the error) of the extractor. This is exactly the same as
in the case of seeded extractors [17] with classical side information.
The main contribution of the current work is the quantum version of the theorem above:
I Theorem 2. Any (k1, . . . , kl, ε)-[strong] l-source extractor is a (k1+log 1ε , . . . , kl+log
1
ε , ε
′)-
[strong] quantum-proof l-source extractor in the Markov model with ε′ =
√
(l + 1)ε2(m−2),
where m is the output length of the extractor.
The formal definitions of the extractors are given in Section 3.2. As in the classical
case, the min-entropy of the sources needs to be just log 1ε higher. The error itself is√
(l + 1)ε2(m−2) where l is the number of sources and m is the number of output bits of the
considered extractor4.
Although the blow-up in the error of the extractor in Theorem 2 might seem relatively
high, one must note that many classical multi-source extractors have an error ε = 2−mc
for some constant c > 1, hence in the quantum case the new error is ε′ =
√
l+1
2 2−m
c−1
2 ,
i.e., both the classical and quantum errors are of the order 2−Ω(m). We provide several
explicit constructions in Appendix B, where we show how to achieve similar parameters
to the classical case, even if ε  2−m, by composing the multi-source extractor with a
quantum-proof seeded extractor.
Apart from presenting the Markov model for extractors and proving the theorems above,
we also contribute on the technical level. While previous works use the techniques of [17]
for the one-bit output case and then extend it using a quantum XOR lemma [16], we use a
completely different proof technique which is based on the recent work of [2]. The advantage
of our technique is that it also applies to weak extractors, whereas the techniques of [6]
require the extractors to be strong in order to prove that they are secure. We extend on our
proof technique in Section 1.3.
1.2 Related work
As far as we are aware, the question of the security of multi-source extractors in the presence
of side information was considered only in two works: [16] and [6]. Both works deal with
quantum side information, and classical side information can of course be taken as a special
case. We are not aware of any works dealing with the case of classical side information
directly.
[16] initiated the study of multi-source extractors in the presence of side information.
They considered the case of two sources and quantum side information in product form.
More specifically, given the two independent sources X1 and X2, the side information is
given by a state ρC1 ⊗ ρC2 such that Hmin(Xi|C1C2) = Hmin(Xi|Ci) ≥ ki. In this way, the
4 This matches exactly the bound proven in [16, Corollary 27] for the restricted case of product side
information, l = 2, and m = 1. We note that this is also an improvement over the constructions in the
model of [6], for which the error in [6, Theorem 5.3] for l = 2 is of the form 2m
√
ε, i.e., an order of
√
2m
worse than ours.
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side information does not break the independence of the sources5. It was proven in [16]
that any one-bit output two-source extractor remains secure in the presence of product side
information. They further show that a specific construction of a multi-bit output two-source
extractor, that of [9], is also secure in the considered model, by reducing it to the one-bit
case.
Recently, another, more general model for an adversary was considered in [6]. For
simplicity, we explain here the model for the case of two sources only; see [6] for the general
definition. In [6] the side information of the adversary must be created in the following way:
in the beginning the adversary can have any bipartite quantum state ρE1E2 , independent of
the sources. Then, to create her final side information ρC1C2 , she can correlate her state with
the sources by performing an independent “leaking operation” from each source to one of
the subsystems. More specifically, they model the leaking operation as a map for i ∈ {1, 2},
Φi : L(Xi ⊗ Ei) → L(Xi ⊗ Ci). The resulting classical-quantum state ρX1X2C1C2 can be
written as ρX1X2C1C2 = Φ1⊗Φ2(ρX1X2E1E2). For the relevant conditions on the min-entropy
see [6].
It was then proven in [6] that for multi-source extractors which are strong in all but
one source, this complex adversarial leaking operation is in fact equivalent to providing the
adversary with side information about only one source. That is, when using an extractor
which is strong in all but one of its sources, any adversary who is restricted to the model
of [6] is in fact no stronger than an adversary who has side information about just one source.
It is further shown that several known extractor constructions are still secure when the
adversary holds quantum side information about one of the sources – with an increase in
the error of the extractor. The leaking model of [6] can also be defined for weak extractors.
However, the proof techniques of [6] only work for strong extractors, since they rely on
the equivalence to side information about one source. Thus, there are currently no known
extractor constructions that directly satisfy the weak extractor model from [6], without
relying on an underlying strong extractor.
Our work is a natural generalization of [16], since independent sources are a subset of
Markov sources. The model from [6] is different from ours in the sense that there exist states
ρX1X2C which are Markov chains but cannot be constructed by the leaking model from [6]
and vice versa. However, as already proven in [6], for a function to satisfy their strong
extractor definition, it is sufficient for it to be secure in the presence of side information about
one of the sources. Since side information about one source is a Markov chain, it follows that
any strong extractor in the Markov model is also a strong extractor in the leaking model
of [6] – for completeness, we provide a proof of this in Appendix A.2. It is currently unknown
whether the same statement holds for weak extractors. Interestingly, the converse statement
also holds: we (implicitly) prove in this work that any function that is an extractor for
side information in product form is an extractor in the Markov model with slightly weaker
parameters. Since the leaking model from [6] includes states in product from, an extractor
from [6] is also an extractor in the Markov model with slightly weaker parameters.
5 [16] also considered another model for the adversary, called the bounded storage model, in which an
assumption is made on the size of the adversary’s storage capacity. In this work we consider only the
more general case, in which we make no assumption about the adversary’s power. For more details
see [16].
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1.3 Proof outline and techniques
The proof of the classical result, i.e., Theorem 1, is quite standard. The main part of this
work is therefore devoted to the quantum case – the proof of Theorem 2. The main idea is to
not consider the most general measurement that could be performed to distinguish the output
of the extractor from uniform, but instead consider a specific strategy, which consists in first
measuring the quantum side information, then trying to distinguish the output from uniform
given the resulting classical side information. We first prove that this specific strategy is not
much worse than the optimal strategy. Then we show that this classical side information
satisfies the requirements of a classical two-source extractor in the Markov model. Thus,
security in the quantum case follows from security in the classical case.
More specifically, the proof can be decomposed in the following steps.
1. We start by considering only product side information in Section 4.1. We employ ideas
from [2], where the security definition of the extractor is rewritten using operators
inequalities, to give a bound in Lemma 12 on the distance from uniform of the extractor
output.
2. Next (in Lemmas 13 and 14) we simplify the bound by noting that it can be seen as
a specific simple distinguishing strategy when trying to distinguish the output of the
extractor from uniform using the side information. This specific strategy is one in which
the product side information is measured independently of the output of the extractor
(while a general distinguisher could use more complicated distinguishing strategies). Hence
we obtain a reduction from quantum to classical side information.
3. We put this together in Lemma 15, to show that any multi-source extractor is secure in
the presence of product side information6.
4. Finally, in Section 4.2, we extend the result from the product model to the quantum
Markov model by exploiting the structure of quantum Markov-chain states, and by this
prove that Theorem 2 holds.
1.4 Organisation of the paper
The rest of paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we give some necessary preliminaries.
Section 3 is devoted to the definitions of classical and quantum-proof multi-source extractors
in the Markov model. The proof of our main theorem, Theorem 2, is then given in Section 4.
We conclude in Section 5 with some open questions.
Do to space restrictions, some additional results have been moved to the appendices. In
Appendix A we show that multi-source extractors in the Markov model can be used to extract
from some sources that do not directly satisfy the definition, e.g., when only a bound on the
smooth min-entropy is given. In Appendix B we give the parameters of explicit constructions
of quantum multi-source extractors, i.e., we apply our results to some specific constructions
of multi-source extractors. In Appendix C we further motivate the Markov model in the
context of quantum randomness amplification protocols. The remaining appendices contain
technical proofs.
2 Preliminaries
We assume familiarity with standard notation in probability theory as well as with basic
concepts in quantum information theory including density matrices, positive-operator valued
6 This can be seen as an extension of the result of [16] but the proof is different.
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measures (POVMs), and distance measures such as the trace distance. We refer to, e.g., [23]
for an introduction to quantum information.
Throughout the paper X,Y and Z denote classical random variables while A,B and C
denote quantum systems. All logarithms are in base 2. [l] denotes the set {1, 2, . . . , l} and
for i ∈ [l] we denote i¯ = 1, . . . , i− 1, i+ 1, . . . , l.
If a classical random variable X takes the value x with probability px it can be written
as the quantum state ρX =
∑
x px|x〉〈x|, where {|x〉}x is an orthonormal basis. If the
classical system X is part of a composite system XC, any state of that composite system
can be written as ρXC =
∑
x px|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxC . If C is quantum we say that the state ρXC is
a classical-quantum state, or a cq-state. Similarly, a state ρX1X2C classical on X1, X2 and
quantum on C is called a ccq-state. For two independent random variables X and Y we
often write X ◦ Y to denote the joint random variable with product distribution.
For a quantum state ρA we denote by H(A) the Von Neumann entropy of ρA, i.e.,
H(A) = −Tr(ρA log ρA). The conditional mutual information is defined as
I(A : B|C) = H(AC) +H(BC)−H(C)−H(ABC) .
In the case of classical systems, the Von Neumann entropy is reduced to the Shannon entropy.
That is, for a random variable X, H(X) = −∑x px log px, where px is the probability of
X = x.
Given a cq-state ρXC =
∑
x px|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxC the conditional min-entropy is Hmin(X|C) =
− log pguess(X|C), where pguess(X|C) is the maximum probability of guessing X given the
quantum system C. That is,
pguess(X|C) = max{Ex
C
}x
(∑
x
pxTr(ExCρxC)
)
,
where the maximum is taken over all POVMs {ExC}x on C. For an empty system C,
the conditional min-entropy of X given C reduces to the usual Hmin(X) = − log maxx px.
Furthermore, if a quantum system C is measured and the measurement outcome is registered
in the classical system Z then the min-entropy can only increase, namely, Hmin(X|Z) ≥
Hmin(X|C).
3 Multi-source extractors
3.1 Multi-source extractors in the presence of classical side information
Two-source extractors are defined as follows. The extension of the definition to the case of
more than two sources is straightforward.
I Definition 3 (Two-source extractor, [27]). A function Ext : {0, 1}n1 × {0, 1}n2 → {0, 1}m
is called a (k1, k2, ε) two-source extractor if for any two independent sources X1, X2 with
Hmin (X1) ≥ k1 and Hmin (X2) ≥ k2, we have
1
2‖Ext (X1, X2)− Um‖ ≤ ε ,
where Um is a perfectly uniform random variable on m-bit strings. Ext is said to be strong
in the i’th input if
1
2‖Ext(X1, X2)Xi − Um ◦Xi‖ ≤ ε .
If Ext is not strong in any of its inputs it is said to be weak.
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As explained in Section 1, in the classical case one can also consider the security of the
extractor in the presence of classical side information, denoted by Z, held by an adversary.
That is, we would like the output of the extractor to be indistinguishable from uniform also
given some additional classical information.
Since multi-source extractors cannot remain secure in the presence of an arbitrary classical
side information (recall the examples presented in Section 1), we require the sources to be
independent conditioned on the side information. Formally:
I Definition 4 (Classical Markov model). The random variables X1, X2 and Z are said to
form a Markov chain, denoted by X1 ↔ Z ↔ X2, if
I(X1 : X2|Z) = 0 .
For more than two sources X1, . . . , Xl and side information Z, we say that they are in the
Markov model if
∀i ∈ [l], I(Xi : Xi¯|Z) = 0 .
To see that I(X1 : X2|Z) = 0 indeed captures the idea that conditioned on Z the sources
are independent, note that I(X1 : X2|Z) = 0 if and only if p(x1, x2|z) = p(x1|z) · p(x2|z) for
all x1, x2 and z.
We can now define classical-proof multi-source extractors in the following way. For
simplicity, we give the definition in the case of two sources; the extension to more than two
sources in the Markov model is straightforward.
I Definition 5 (Classical-proof two-source extractor). A function Ext : {0, 1}n1 × {0, 1}n2 →
{0, 1}m is a (k1, k2, ε) classical-proof two-source extractor secure in the Markov model, if for
all sources X1, X2, and classical side information Z, where X1 ↔ Z ↔ X2 form a Markov
chain, and with min-entropy Hmin (X1|Z) ≥ k1 and Hmin (X2|Z) ≥ k2, we have
1
2‖Ext (X1, X2)Z − Um ◦ Z‖ ≤ ε , (1)
where Um is a perfectly uniform random variable on m-bit strings. Ext is said to be strong
in the i’th input if
1
2‖Ext(X1, X2)XiZ − Um ◦XiZ‖ ≤ ε . (2)
Indeed, if one requires that the sources and the side information Z fulfil Definition 4 then
all multi-source extractors remain secure also in the presence of the side information Z. This
is proven in the following lemma for two sources.
I Lemma 6. Any (k1, k2, ε)-[strong] two-source extractor is a (k1 + log 1ε , k2 + log
1
ε , 3ε)-
[strong] classical-proof two-source extractor in the Markov model.
Proof. Let X1 ↔ Z ↔ X2 be such that Hmin (X1|Z) ≥ k1 + log 1ε and Hmin (X2|Z) ≥
k2 + log 1ε . For any two classical systems X and Z, we have
2−Hmin(X|Z) = E
z←Z
[
2−Hmin(X|Z=z)
]
,
so by Markov’s inequality,
Pr
z←Z
[Hmin (X|Z = z) ≤ Hmin (X|Z)− log 1/ε] ≤ ε .
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Applying this to both X1 and X2, we have that with probability at least 1− 2ε (over Z),
Hmin (X1|Z = z) ≥ k1 and Hmin (X2|Z = z) ≥ k2. Due to the Markov-chain condition, the
distributions X1|Z=z and X2|Z=z are independent. Hence for any (k1, k2, ε) two-source
extractor Ext,
1
2‖Ext(X1, X2)Z − Um ◦ Z‖ =
1
2
∑
z
PZ(z)‖Ext(X1|Z=z, X2|Z=z)− Um‖ ≤ 3ε .
For a strong extractor the proof is identical. J
By following the same steps as the proof of Lemma 6 for the case of l sources we get
Theorem 1.
3.2 Multi-source extractors in the presence of quantum side
information
We now consider multi-source extractors in the presence of quantum side information, i.e., in
the following C denotes a quantum system. Similarly to Section 3.1 we restrict the sources
and the quantum side information to the quantum Markov model. Formally,
I Definition 7 (Quantum Markov model). A ccq-state ρX1X2C is said to form a Markov
chain7, denoted by X1 ↔ C ↔ X2, if
I(X1 : X2|C) = 0 .
For more than two sources X1, . . . , Xl and C we say that they are in the Markov model if
∀i ∈ [l], I(Xi : Xi¯|C) = 0 .
The following is then the natural analog of Definition 5 to the quantum setting. The
extension to the case of more than two sources is straightforward.
I Definition 8 (Quantum-proof two-source extractor). A function Ext : {0, 1}n1 × {0, 1}n2 →
{0, 1}m is a (k1, k2, ε) quantum-proof two-source extractor in the Markov model, if for all
sources X1, X2, and quantum side information C, where X1 ↔ C ↔ X2 form a Markov
chain, and with min-entropy Hmin (X1|C) ≥ k1 and Hmin (X2|C) ≥ k2, we have
1
2‖ρExt(X1,X2)C − ρUm ⊗ ρC‖ ≤ ε , (3)
where ρExt(X1,X2)C = Ext ⊗ 1CρX1X2C and ρUm is the fully mixed state on a system of
dimension 2m. Ext is said to be strong in the i’th input if
1
2‖ρExt(X1,X2)XiC − ρUm ⊗ ρXiC‖ ≤ ε . (4)
If C above is classical then Definition 8 is reduced to Definition 5.
The interesting question is therefore whether there exist quantum-proof multi-source
extractors. The main contribution of this work is to show that any multi-source extractor
is also a quantum-proof multi-source extractor in the Markov model with a bit weaker
parameters. The formal statement is given in Theorem 2 above and proven in the following
section.
7 The same definition is also used in the more general case where also the Xi’s are quantum. For our
purpose the case of classical sources and quantum side information is sufficient.
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4 Security of multi-source extractors in the quantum Markov model
For simplicity, in this section we prove that two-source extractors are secure even when
considering quantum side information in the form of a Markov chain. The extension to any
number of sources, i.e., the proof of Theorem 2, follows by trivially repeating the same steps
for more than two sources and using our definition of the Markov model (Definition 7). More
specifically, the goal of this section is to prove the following:
I Lemma 9. Any (k1, k2, ε)-[strong] two-source extractor is a (k1 + log 1ε , k2 + log
1
ε ,
√
3ε ·
2(m/2−1))-[strong] quantum-proof two-source extractor in the Markov model, where m is the
output length of the extractor.
To prove this, we first show in Section 4.1 that all extractors are still secure in the case
of side information in product from. Then in Section 4.2 we generalise this result to any side
information in the Markov model.
4.1 Product quantum side information
We start by showing that any two-source extractor, as in Definition 3, is secure against
product quantum side information. The product extractor as defined below is a special case
of the extractor in Definition 8:
I Definition 10 (Quantum-proof product two-source extractor, [16]). A function Ext :
{0, 1}n1 × {0, 1}n2 → {0, 1}m is a (k1, k2, ε) quantum-proof product two-source extractor, if
for all sources X1, X2, and quantum side information C, where ρX1X1C = ρX1C1 ⊗ ρX2C2 ,
and with min-entropy Hmin (X1|C1) ≥ k1 and Hmin (X2|C2) ≥ k2, we have
1
2‖ρExt(X1,X2)C − ρUm ⊗ ρC‖ ≤ ε , (5)
where ρExt(X1,X2)C = Ext ⊗ 1CρX1X2C and ρUm is the fully mixed state on a system of
dimension 2m. Ext is said to be strong in the i’th input if
1
2‖ρExt(X1,X2)XiC − ρUm ⊗ ρXiCi ⊗ ρCi¯‖ ≤ ε . (6)
In the following we show that any two-source extractor remains secure in the product
model, i.e., if the quantum state of the sources and the side information is of the form
ρX1X2C = ρX1C1 ⊗ ρX2C2 (see Corollary 16 below for the formal statement). This can be
seen as an extension of the results of [16], where only two-source extractors with one-bit
output (i.e., m = 1 in our notation) and the extractor of [9] were shown to be secure against
product quantum side information.
The first step of the proof uses the fact that any ccq-state ρX1X2C can be obtained by
performing local measurements on a pure state ρABC . We formalise this in the following
lemma. The proof of the lemma is trivial and given in Appendix D.
I Lemma 11. Let ρX1X2C =
∑
x1,x2
|x1〉〈x1| ⊗ |x2〉〈x2|ρC(x1, x2). Then there exists a pure
state ρABC and POVMs {Fx1}, {Gx2} such that
ρC(x1, x2) = TrAB
[
F
1
2
x1 ⊗G
1
2
x2 ⊗ 1CρABCF
1
2
x1 ⊗G
1
2
x2 ⊗ 1C
]
. (7)
The following three lemmas are proven for the case of weak extractors. The lemmas and
proofs for the strong case are very similar and therefore given in Appendix E. We start with
the next lemma where the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality is used, as in [2].
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I Lemma 12. Let ρX1X2C be any ccq-state, and let ρABC and {Fx1}, {Gx2} satisfy Equa-
tion (7). Then there exists an alternative purification of ρAB, namely ΨABC1C2 , and two
POVMs {Hz1}, {Kz2} acting on C1 and C2, such that
1
M
‖ρExt(X1,X2)C − ρUm ⊗ ρC‖2 ≤∑
x1,x2,
z1,z2,y
[
δExt(x1,x2)=y −
1
M
] [
δExt(z1,z2)=y −
1
M
]
Tr [ΨABC1C2Fx1 ⊗Gx2 ⊗Hz1 ⊗Kz2 ] ,
where M = 2m and m is the output length of the extractor. Moreover, if the state ρAB is of
tensor product form, the purification ΨABC1C2 also factorises into a tensor product between
AC1 and BC2.
Proof. First, recall that for a hermitian matrix R we have ‖R‖ = max{Tr[RS] : −1 ≤ S ≤
1}. Applying this to the matrix whose norm specifies the error of the extractor, we find
‖ρExt(X1,X2)C − ρUm ⊗ ρC‖ = max−1≤S≤1Tr
[(
ρExt(X1,X2)C − ρUm ⊗ ρC
)
S
]
.
Since ρExt(X1,X2)C and ρUm ⊗ ρC are block diagonal with respect to the outcome variable of
the extractor y, S can be assumed to be block diagonal as well. Using this and inserting the
expression for ρX1X2C in Equation (7) we arrive at
‖ρExt(X1,X2)C − ρUm ⊗ ρC‖ = max−1≤Sy≤1
∑
y
Tr [ρABC∆y ⊗ Sy] ,
where we used the abbreviation
∆y =
∑
x1,x2
[
δExt(x1,x2)=y −
1
M
]
Fx1 ⊗Gx2 .
We now choose a special purification of ρAB, namely we consider the pretty good purifica-
tion [39]
|ψ〉ABA′B′ = ρ
1
2
AB ⊗ 1A′B′ |ΦAA′〉|ΦBB′〉 ,
where |Φ〉AA′ =
∑
a |aa〉 denotes the unnormalised maximally entangled state. Since both
|ψ〉ABA′B′ and ρABC are purifications of ρAB there exists an isometry V : A′B′ → C such
that V |ψ〉〈ψ|V ∗ = ρABC and hence
‖ρExt(X1,X2)C − ρUm ⊗ ρC‖ ≤ max−1≤Sy≤1
∑
y
Tr [|ψ〉〈ψ|∆y ⊗ Sy] ,
since V ∗SyV is bounded in norm by one and hermitian. Inserting the identity 1⊗XA′ |ΦAA′〉 =
XTA′ ⊗ 1|ΦAA′〉 for any matrix X (where (.)T denotes the transpose in the basis of the
maximally entangled state), we find
Tr [|ψ〉〈ψ|∆y ⊗ Sy] = Tr
[
ρ
1
2
AB∆yρ
1
2
AB(Sy)T
]
. (8)
The crucial observation is now that the sesquilinear form (Ry)×(Sy) 7→
∑
y Tr
[
ρ
1
2
ABR
∗
yρ
1
2
ABSy
]
on block-diagonal matrices is positive semi-definite and hence fulfils the Cauchy-Schwarz
inequality. Applying this gives
‖ρExt(X1,X2)C − ρUm ⊗ ρC‖2 ≤
(∑
y
Tr
[
ρ
1
2
AB∆yρ
1
2
AB∆y
])(∑
y
Tr
[
ρ
1
2
ABSyρ
1
2
ABSy
])
.
TQC 2016
2:12 Quantum-Proof Multi-Source randomness Extractors
Since we have that the norm of Sy is bounded by one, the terms in the second sum satisfies
Tr
[
ρ
1
2
ABSyρ
1
2
ABSy
]
≤ Tr
[
ρ
1
2
ABSyρ
1
2
AB
]
≤ Tr [ρAB ] = 1 ,
and we arrive at
‖ρExt(X1,X2)C − ρUm ⊗ ρC‖2 ≤M
∑
y
Tr
[
ρ
1
2
AB∆yρ
1
2
AB∆y
]
.
Inserting the definition of ∆y and reversing the identity leading to Equation (8) proves the
assertion with C1 = A′, C2 = B′, ΨABC1C2 = |ψ〉〈ψ| and Hz1 = FTz1 , Kz2 = GTz2 . J
The upper bound of the preceding lemma can be further simplified (the proof is given in
Appendix D):
I Lemma 13. For any ΨABC1C2 and positive operators {Fx1}, {Gx2}, {Hz1}, {Kz2} which
sum up to the identity,∑
x1,x2,
z1,z2,y
[
δExt(x1,x2)=y −
1
M
] [
δExt(z1,z2)=y −
1
M
]
Tr [ΨABC1C2Fx1 ⊗Gx2 ⊗Hz1 ⊗Kz2 ]
=
∑
x1,x2,z1,z2|
Ext(x1,x2)=Ext(z1,z2)
Tr [ΨABC1C2Fx1 ⊗Gx2 ⊗Hz1 ⊗Kz2 ]−
1
M
(9)
The quantity in Equation (9) can be seen as a simple distinguishing strategy of a
distinguisher trying to distinguish the output of the extractor from uniform given classical
side information. We can therefore relate it to the error of the extractor in the case of
classical side information, i.e., to Equation (1). This is shown in the following lemma.
I Lemma 14. For i ∈ {1, 2} let Zi denote the classical side information about the source Xi
such that p(x1, x2, z1, z2) = Tr [ΨABC1C2Fx1 ⊗Gx2 ⊗Hz1 ⊗Kz2 ]. Then∑
x1,x2,z1,z2|
Ext(x1,x2)=Ext(z1,z2)
p(x1, x2, z1, z2)− 1
M
≤ 12‖Ext (X1, X2)Z1Z2 − Um ◦ Z1Z2‖ .
Proof. Define the following random variables over {0, 1}m × {0, 1}n1 × {0, 1}n2 :
R = Ext(X1, X2)Z1Z2 ; Q = Um ◦ Z1Z2 .
Let A? = {(a1, a2, a3)∣∣a1 = Ext (a2, a3)} ⊆ {0, 1}m × {0, 1}n1 × {0, 1}n2 . Then, the probab-
ilities that R and Q assign to the event A? are
R(A?) =
∑
x1,x2,z1,z2|
Ext(x1,x2)=Ext(z1,z2)
p(x1, x2, z1, z2) ; Q(A?) = 1
M
Using the definition of the variational distance we therefore have
1
2‖Ext(X1, X2)Z1Z2 − Um ◦ Z1Z2‖ = supA ‖R(A)−Q(A)‖
≥ R(A?)−Q(A?)
=
∑
x1,x2,z1,z2|
Ext(x1,x2)=Ext(z1,z2)
p(x1, x2, z1, z2)− 1
M
. J
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Finally, we combine the lemmas together to show that any weak classical-proof two-source
extractor in the Markov model is secure against product quantum side information as well.
I Lemma 15. Any (k1, k2, ε) classical-proof two-source extractor in the Markov model is
a
(
k1, k2,
√
ε · 2(m−2)
)
quantum-proof product two-source extractor, where m is the output
length of the extractor.
Proof. For any state of two classical sources and product side information ρX1X2C =
ρX1C1 ⊗ ρX2C2 with Hmin(X1|C) ≥ k1 and Hmin(X2|C) ≥ k2, let ρABC and {Fx1}, {Gx2} be
the state and measurements satisfying Equation (7).
We can now apply Lemmas 12, 13, and 14 to get the bound
‖ρExt(X1,X2)C − ρUm ⊗ ρC‖ ≤
√
M
2 ‖Ext (X1, X2)Z1Z2 − Um ◦ Z1Z2‖ , (10)
where Z1, Z2 are defined via p(x1, x2, z1, z2) = Tr [ΨABC1C2Fx1 ⊗Gx2 ⊗Hz1 ⊗Kz2 ], for
ΨABC1C2 which is constructed in the proof of Lemma 12.
As ΨABC1C2 = ΨAC1 ⊗ΨBC2 and the measurements are all in tensor product we have
p(x1, x2, z1, z2) = p(x1, z1) · p(x2, z2), which implies:
1. The sources and the classical side information form a Markov chain X1 ↔ Z1Z2 ↔ X2.
2. Hmin (Xi|Z1Z2) = Hmin (Xi|Zi) ≥ Hmin (Xi|Ci) for i ∈ {1, 2}.
Hence, if Hmin (Xi|Ci) ≥ ki then by the definition of a classical-proof two-source extractor,
1
2‖Ext (X1, X2)Z1Z2 − Um ◦ Z1Z2‖ ≤ ε . (11)
Combining Equations (10) and (11) we get
1
2‖ρExt(X1,X2)C − ρUm ⊗ ρC‖ ≤
1
2
√
Mε =
√
ε2(m−2) . J
By combining Lemma 6 together with Lemma 15 (Lemma 36 in Appendix E) for the
weak (strong) case we get that any weak (strong) two-source extractor is also secure against
product quantum side information. The bound given in Corollary 16 matches exactly the
bound given in [16] for the special case of m = 1 (see [16, Corollary 27]).
I Corollary 16. Any (k1, k2, ε)-[strong] two-source extractor is a (k1 + log 1ε , k2 + log
1
ε , ε
′)-
[strong] quantum-proof product two-source extractor with ε′ =
√
3ε2(m−2), where m is the
output length of the extractor.
4.2 Extending to the Markov model
We now extend the result of Section 4.1 to the case of the more general Markov model. To
do so, we first recall that by the result of [14], Markov states (according to Definition 7) can
also be written in the form
ρA1A2C =
⊕
t
p(t)ρtA1Ct1 ⊗ ρ
t
A2Ct2
, (12)
where the index t runs over a finite alphabet T , p(t) is a probability distribution on that
alphabet, HC =
⊕
tHCt1 ⊗HCt2 is the Hilbert space of C, and ρtAiCti denote states on AiC
t
i ,
i ∈ {1, 2}.
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Proof of Lemma 9. Let ρX1X2C be a Markov state such that Hmin (Xi|C) ≥ ki + log 1ε . We
first deal with the case of weak extractors. Using the decomposition from Equation (12) we
can reduce the problem to the product case by writing
‖ρExt(X1,X2)C − ρUm ⊗ ρC‖ =
∑
t
p(t)‖Ext⊗ 1C
(
ρtX1Ct1
⊗ ρtX2Ct2
)
− ρUm ⊗ ρtCt1 ⊗ ρ
t
Ct2
‖ .
From Equation (10) we thus have
‖ρExt(X1,X2)C − ρUm ⊗ ρC‖
≤
∑
t
p(t)
√
M
2 ‖Ext(X1, X2)Z1Z2|T = t− Um ◦ Z1Z2|T = t‖
≤
√
M
2 ‖Ext(X1, X2)Z1Z2T − Um ◦ Z1Z2T‖ ,
where in the last line we used Jensen’s inequality and Z1, Z2 are defined via
p(x1, x2, z1, z2|t) = Tr
[
ρtABCF
t
x1 ⊗Gtx2 ⊗Htz1 ⊗Ktz2
]
.
That is, Z1 and Z2 are derived from C in the following way: from Equation (12) the
states {ρtCt1 ⊗ ρ
t
Ct2
}t are orthogonal, hence there exists an isometry C → CT which maps∑
t p(t)ρtCt1 ⊗ ρ
t
Ct2
to
∑
t p(t)ρtCt1 ⊗ ρ
t
Ct2
⊗ |t〉〈t|. The state ρtCt1 ⊗ ρ
t
Ct2
is then measured in the
same way as in Lemma 15 for the product case to get the side information Z1Z2|T . Hence, the
structure X1 ↔ Z1Z2T ↔ X2 is conserved. Furthermore, we also have Hmin (Xi|Z1Z2T ) ≥
ki + log 1ε . Using these two conditions, the problem has been reduced to one with classical
side information in the Markov model. Using the fact that Ext is a (k1, k2, ε) two-source
extractor and applying Lemma 6 we conclude the proof for weak extractors.
Similarly, for strong extractors, from Equation (16) we have
‖ρExt(X1,X2)X1C − ρUm ⊗ ρX1C‖
≤
∑
t
p(t)
√
M
2 ‖Ext(X1, X2)X1Z2|T = t− Um ◦X1Z2|T = t‖
≤
√
M
2 ‖Ext(X1, X2)X1Z2T − Um ◦X1Z2T‖ .
Again, we can see this as a measurement made on C such that the value of T is measured
and then a further measurements of Ct2 is done in the same way as for the product case
to get the side information about X2 (while there is no additional side information about
X1). Hence, as in the weak case, X1 ↔ Z2T ↔ X2 and Hmin (Xi|Z2T ) ≥ ki + log 1ε , so the
problem has been reduced to the classical case. J
In the case of l sources, a state ρX[l]C that satisfies the Markov model (Definition 7) can
be written as
ρX[l]C =
⊕
t
p(t)ρtX1Ct1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρ
t
XlCtl
. (13)
We provide a proof of this in Appendix D as Lemma 32. It follows from Equation (13) that
Lemma 9 can be easily generalised to l sources.
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5 Conclusions and open questions
In this work a new and natural model for classical and quantum-proof multi-source extractors
was defined – the Markov model. We then showed that all multi-source extractors, weak and
strong, are also secure in the presence of side information that falls into the Markov model,
both in the classical and quantum case. As explained in the previous sections, our main
result, Theorem 2, can be seen as a continuation, extension and improvement of previously
known results [16, 6].
Apart from the result itself, on the technical level, a new proof technique was used, which,
in contrast to the previous works is indifferent to whether the extractors are strong or not.
In particular this implies that no adaptations are required for any new multi-source extractor
that might be proposed in the future.
We finish this work with several open questions:
1. Are there more general models that extend the Markov model in which all extractors
remain secure? Some natural extensions are discussed in Appendix A.
2. Are there different families of states ρX1X2C from which it is possible to extract randomness
that are relevant for practical applications? The difficulty in extracting randomness comes
from the fact that we are not given one (known) state ρX1X2C , but that the extractor is
expected to work for any state in a given family, e.g., a Markov state with lower bounds
on the conditional min-entropy. The standard criterion of independence between the
sources X1 and X2 has been relaxed in this work to allow for sources that are independent
conditioned on C. Other structures might also allow randomness to be extracted.
3. What happens if the sources and the side information are not exactly in the Markov model
but only close to it? Even in the case of only two sources, there are different ways to
quantify the closeness of a state to a Markov-chain state (see, e.g., [10]). It is interesting
to ask which notion of approximation is relevant in applications of multi-source extractors
(such as quantum randomness amplification) and under which such notions the quantum-
proof extractors remain secure. Note that the recovery map notion of approximation
of Markov chains [10] does not guarantee approximate conditional independence of the
sources, and seems to provide quite a different structure.
4. It is unclear whether Theorem 2 is tight, i.e., whether the loss in the error of the extractor
is inevitable when considering arbitrary extractors. In other words, it is not known if there
are multi-source extractors for which the
√
2m loss in the error term is necessary8. In the
other direction, as noted in Appendix B.1, the work of [13] can be used, in combination
with our proof technique, to show that for two-universal hashing (when the seed is taken
to be the second source) the blow-up in the error term is not necessary.
5. Do multi-source extractors remain secure also in the presence of non-signalling side
information? Non-signalling adversaries are in general more powerful than quantum
ones. For seeded extractors this does not seem to be the case [12, 1] but for multi-source
extractors nothing is known. Note however that our proof technique is not applicable to
non-signalling side information.
Acknowledgments. We thank Mario Berta, Omar Fawzi and Thomas Vidick for helpful
comments and discussions.
8 The same question arises in the case of seeded extractors as well [2].
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A Extending the set of extractable sources
Although the definition of a quantum-proof two-source extractors (Definition 8) requires the
source ρX1EX2 to be a Markov chain with a bound on the min-entropy, a function proven be
such an extractor can also be used to extract randomness from a larger set of sources, e.g., if
the adversary were to destroy her side information E, this would not hinder extraction, yet
it could destroy the Markov chain property of the source. In this section we consider two
extensions of the multi-source extractor definition for which all multi-source extractors in
the Markov model can be used. In Appendix A.1 we show that it is not necessary to have a
bound on the min-entropy, it is sufficient to bound the smooth min-entropy of the sources X1
and X2. Then in Appendix A.2 we show that one can also extract from any source obtained
by deleting information from a Markov source, even though the resulting state might not be
a Markov chain any longer. The multi-source extractor model for strong extractors from [6]
falls in this category.
A.1 Smooth min-entropy
It is standard for the extractor definitions to require a bound on the min-entropy of the source
conditioned on the side information, i.e., Hmin(Xi|C) ≥ ki. In practical situations, however,
one often only has a bound on the smooth min-entropy – this is defined by maximising the
min-entropy over all states δ-close, see Equation (14) below. For example, in quantum key
distribution a bound on the smooth min-entropy is obtained by sampling the noise on the
quantum channel [35]. In this section we prove that any quantum-proof two-source extractor
can be used in a context where only a bound on the smooth min-entropy is known.
The smooth conditional min-entropy with smoothness parameter δ of a state ρXC is
defined as follows.
Hδmin(X|C)ρ = max
σ∈Bδ(ρ)
Hmin(X|C)σ, (14)
where Bδ(ρ) is a ball of radius δ around ρXC . This ball is defined as the set of subnormalized
states σ with P (ρ, σ) ≤ δ, where P (·, ·) is the purified distance [34]. The exact definition of
the purified distance is not needed in this paper, so we omit it for simplicity and refer the
interested reader to [34]. The only property of the purified distance that we need in this
work is that for any (subnormalized) ρ and σ,
P (ρ, σ) ≥ 12‖ρ− σ‖.
This means that if Hδmin(X|C)ρ ≥ k, then there exists a subnormalized σXC such that
1
2‖ρ− σ‖ ≤ δ and Hmin(X|C)σ ≥ k.
We can now state our main lemma. This can be generalised to the multi-source case in a
straightforward manner.
I Lemma 17. Let Ext : {0, 1}n1×{0, 1}n2 → {0, 1}m be a (k1−log 1/ε1−1, k2−log 1/ε2−1, ε)
quantum-proof two-source extractor in the Markov model. Then for any Markov state ρX1X2C
with Hδ1min(X1|C)ρ ≥ k1 and Hδ2min(X2|C)ρ ≥ k2,
1
2‖ρExt(X1,X2)C − ρUm ⊗ ρC‖ ≤ 6δ1 + 6δ2 + 2ε1 + 2ε2 + 2ε
R. Arnon-Friedman, C. Portmann, and V. B. Scholz 2:19
if the extractor is weak, and
1
2‖ρExt(X1,X2)XiC − ρUm ⊗ ρXiC‖ ≤ 6δ1 + 6δ2 + 2ε1 + 2ε2 + 2ε
if the extractor is strong in the source Xi.
To prove that Lemma 17 holds, we first need to prove that if a state ρX1X2C is guaranteed
to be a Markov state with bounded smooth min-entropy, then there is a (subnormalized)
state σX1X2C close by which is also a Markov state with a bound on the min-entropy. This
can be seen as a robustness property of the Markov model for extractors.
I Lemma 18. Let ρX1X2C be a Markov state X1 ↔ C ↔ X2 such that Hδ1min(X1|C)ρ ≥
k1 and Hδ2min(X2|C)ρ ≥ k2. Then there exists a subnormalized state σX1X2C such that
X1, X2 and C still form a Markov chain X1 ↔ C ↔ X2, and Hmin(X1|C)σ ≥ k1 − log 1ε1 ,
Hmin(X2|C)σ ≥ k2 − log 1ε2 and 12‖ρ− σ‖ ≤ ε1 + ε2 + 3δ1 + 3δ2.
Proof. By the Markov chain condition, the state ρX1X2C can equivalently be written
ρX1C1ZE2X2 =
∑
x1,x2,z
p(z)p(x1|z)p(x2|z)|x1〉〈x1| ⊗ ρx1,zC1 ⊗ |z〉〈z| ⊗ ρ
x2,z
C2
⊗ |x2〉〈x2|.
Thus Hδ1min(X1|C)ρ = Hδ1min(X1|C1Z)ρ and Hδ2min(X2|C)ρ = Hδ2min(X2|C2Z)ρ. In the following
we use only this form with the explicit classical register Z.
By the definition of smooth min-entropy, we know that there exist (subnormalized) states
σ˜X1C1Z =
∑
x1,z
q1(z)q(x1|z)|x1〉〈x1| ⊗ σx1,zC1 ⊗ |z〉〈z|
and σˆX2C2Z =
∑
x2,z
q2(z)q(x2|z)|x2〉〈x2| ⊗ σx2,zC2 ⊗ |z〉〈z|
such that 12‖ρX1C1Z − σ˜X1C1Z‖ ≤ δ1, 12‖ρX2C2Z − σˆX2C2Z‖ ≤ δ2, Hmin(X1|C1Z)σ˜ ≥ k1 and
Hmin(X2|C2Z)σˆ ≥ k2.
Since 2−Hmin(X1|CZ)σ =
∑
z q(z)2−Hmin(X1|CZ=z)σ also for subnormalized distributions
q(·), we can define 2−Hmin(X1|CZ=z)σ := 0 when q(z) = 0, then pad q(·) to get a normalized
distribution for which 2−Hmin(X1|CZ)σ = Ez
[
2−Hmin(X1|CZ=z)σ
]
. We can thus use Markov’s
inequality and get
Pr
z←Z
[
Hmin(X1|C1Z = z)σ˜ ≤ k1 − log 1
ε1
]
≤ ε1
and Pr
z←Z
[
Hmin(X2|C2Z = z)σˆ ≤ k2 − log 1
ε2
]
≤ ε2 .
Let Z1 and Z2 be the sets of values for which q1(z1) 6= 0, q2(z2) 6= 0, and
∀z1 ∈ Z1, Hmin(X1|C1Z = z1)σ˜ ≥ k1 − log 1
ε1
and ∀z2 ∈ Z2, Hmin(X2|C2Z = z2)σˆ ≥ k2 − log 1
ε2
.
Let Z¯ := Z1 ∩Z2 be their intersection, and let p¯(z) be a subnormalized distribution given by
p¯(z) :=
{
p(z) if z ∈ Z¯,
0 otherwise.
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We define the (subnormalized) state
σX1C1ZC2X2 :=
∑
x,y,z
p¯(z)q(x1|z)q(x2|z)|x1〉〈x1| ⊗ σx1,zC1 ⊗ |z〉〈z| ⊗ σ
x2,z
C2
⊗ |x2〉〈x2|,
and prove in the following that it satisfies the conditions of the lemma.
By construction of σ we have 2−Hmin(X1|C1Z)σ =
∑
z p¯(z)2−Hmin(X1|C1Z=z)σ for values
z such that Hmin(X1|C1Z = z)σ ≥ k1 − log 1ε1 . Hence Hmin(X1|C1Z)σ ≥ k1 − log 1ε1 and
similarly Hmin(X2|C2Z)σ ≥ k2 − log 1ε2 .
To bound the distance from ρX1C1ZC2X2 , first note that
1
2
∑
z
|p¯(z)− p(z)| ≤ ε1 + ε2 + δ1 + δ2.
We also have∑
x1,z
p(z)
2 ‖p(x1|z)ρ
x1,z
C1
− q(x1|z)σx1,zC1 ‖ ≤∑
x1,z
1
2‖p(z)p(x1|z)ρ
x1,z
C1
− q1(z)q(x1|z)σx1,zC1 ‖+
1
2‖q1(z)q(x1|z)σ
x1,z
C1
− p(z)q(x1|z)σx1,zC1 ‖
≤ 2δ1.
The same holds for X2C2Z, namely∑
x2,z
p(z)
2 ‖p(x2|z)ρ
x2,z
C2
− q(x2|z)σx2,zC2 ‖ ≤ 2δ2.
Putting this together we get
1
2‖ρX1C1ZC2X2 − σX1C1ZC2X2‖
=
∑
x,y,z
1
2‖p(z)p(x1|z)p(x2|z)ρ
x1,z
C1
⊗ ρx2,zC2 − p¯(z)q(x1|z)q(x2|z)σ
x1,z
C1
⊗ σx2,zC2 ‖
=
∑
x,y,z
p(z)
2 ‖p(x1|z)p(x2|z)ρ
x1,z
C1
⊗ ρx2,zC2 − q(x1|z)q(x2|z)σ
x1,z
C1
⊗ σx2,zC2 ‖
+ ε1 + ε2 + δ1 + δ2
≤
∑
x,y,z
p(z)
2 ‖p(x1|z)p(x2|z)ρ
x1,z
C1
⊗ ρx2,zC2 − q(x1|z)p(x2|z)σ
x1,z
C1
⊗ ρx2,zC2 ‖
+ p(z)2 ‖q(x1|z)p(x2|z)σ
x1,z
C1
⊗ ρx2,zC2 − q(x1|z)q(x2|z)σ
x1,z
C1
⊗ σx2,zC2 ‖
+ ε1 + ε2 + δ1 + δ2
=
∑
x1,z
p(z)
2 ‖p(x1|z)ρ
x1,z
C1
− q(x1|z)σx1,zC1 ‖
+
∑
x2,z
p(z)
2 ‖p(x2|z)ρ
x2,z
C2
− q(x2|z)σx2,zC2 ‖+ ε1 + ε2 + δ1 + δ2
≤ ε1 + ε2 + 3δ1 + 3δ2. J
Since Lemma 18 finds a subnormalized state that is close, the next step is to prove
that one can extract from subnormalized states. This is done in Appendix F in Lemma 37.
Combining this with a simple use of the triangle inequality allows us to prove Lemma 17.
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Proof of Lemma 17. We prove the case of a weak extractor Ext. The proof for a strong
extractor is identical.
By Lemma 18 there exists a subnormalized Markov state σX1X2C such that 12‖ρX1X2C −
σX1X2C‖ ≤ ε1 + ε2 + 3δ1 + 3δ2 and Hmin(Xi|C)σ ≥ ki − log 1/εi. Hence
1
2‖ρExt(X1,X2)C − ρUm ⊗ ρC‖
≤ 12‖ρExt(X1,X2)C − σExt(X1,X2)C‖+
1
2‖σExt(X1,X2)C − ρUm ⊗ σC‖
+ 12‖ρUm ⊗ σC − ρUm ⊗ ρC‖
≤ 2ε1 + 2ε2 + 6δ1 + 6δ2 + 12‖σExt(X1,X2)C − ρUm ⊗ σC‖
≤ 2ε1 + 2ε2 + 6δ1 + 6δ2 + 2ε ,
where in the last line we used Lemma 37. J
A.2 Non-Markov sources
It is trivial to show that if part of the side information E is deleted, this cannot decrease the
security of an extractor. As already observed in [6], in the case of an extractor that is strong
in the source Xi, any operation on E conditioned on Xi cannot help an adversary either.
Intuitively, this holds because the adversary is given the entire source Xi, thus copying
information about it to E is pointless. We formalize this in the following lemma.
I Lemma 19. Let ρX1EX2 be a Markov source with Hmin(Xi|E)ρ ≥ ki. Let E : L(E)→ L(E)
be any CPTP map on E. If Ext is a (k1, k2, ε) quantum-proof two-source extractor, then it
can be used to extract from σX1EX2 = E(ρX1EX2) with error ε. Let E : L(XiE)→ L(XiE) be
a CPTP map that leaves Xi unmodified, i.e., E(
∑
x px|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxE) =
∑
x px|x〉〈x| ⊗ Ex(ρxE)
for some set of CPTP maps Ex : L(HE) → L(HE). If Ext is a (k1, k2, ε) quantum-proof
two-source extractor strong in Xi, then it can be used to extract from σX1EX2 = E(ρX1EX2)
with error ε.
Proof. We prove the case of the strong extractor. The proof for the weak extractor follows
the same steps. We need to show that
1
2‖σExt(X1,X2)XiE − ρUm ⊗ σXiE‖ ≤ ε .
This follows from the contractivity of the trace distance and because the maps Ext and E
commute:
1
2‖σExt(X1,X2)XiE − ρUm ⊗ σXiE‖ =
1
2‖E(ρExt(X1,X2)XiE)− ρUm ⊗ E(σXiE)‖
≤ 12‖ρExt(X1,X2)XiE − ρUm ⊗ ρXiE‖ ≤ ε . J
An equivalent result in [6, Theorem 4.1] allows the authors to prove that their complex
information leaking model can be reduced to side information about one of the sources, which
implies that a strong extractor in the Markov model is also an extractor in the model of [6].
Note that, as already observed in [6], the entropy of the state σX1EX2 is not meaningful,
since the operation E might delete information without reducing the capacity to distinguish
the output of the extractor from uniform. One has to measure the entropy on the Markov
state before E is applied [6].
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B Explicit constructions
In this section we give some examples for explicit constructions of quantum-proof multi-source
extractors in the Markov model, as follows from our main theorem, Theorem 2.
In Appendix B.1 we consider a two-source extractor by Dodis et al. [9]. This extractor
requires the sum of the entropies in both sources to be larger than n, and we get a construction
with nearly identical parameters in the quantum case. In Appendix B.2 we consider a two-
source extractor construction by Raz [27], which requires one source to have entropy at least
n/2, whereas the other can be logarithmic. Here too, the resulting quantum-proof extractor
has nearly identical parameters to the classical case. In Appendix B.3 we look at a three
source extractor by Li [20], which only requires the sources to have entropy poly-logarithmic
in n. Plugging this in our main theorem allows a sublinear amount of entropy to be extracted
in the quantum case, and by combining it with Trevisan’s extractor [8], we can extract the
remaining entropy and thus obtain the same output length as in the classical case. The final
construction we analyse in Appendix B.4 is based on a recent two-source extractor by Li [18],
which only needs two sources of poly-logarithmic min-entropy. Unfortunately, the error is
n−Ω(1), which means that Theorem 2 only allows Ω(logn) bits to be extracted. Composing
this with another variant of Trevisan’s extractor [8] allows a sublinear amount of randomness
to be extracted at the cost of requiring one of the sources to have k = nα bits of entropy for
any constant α < 1.
Since the works of Dodis et al. [9] and Raz [27] provide the exact parameters for their
extractors, we do the same here below in Appendices B.1 and B.2. In contrast, for the two
extractors from [20, 18] the exact parameters are unknown, as only the simplified O-notation
form is given in the corresponding papers. For this reason the constructions in Appendices B.3
and B.4 are also given in O-notation.
B.1 High entropy sources
The first extractor we consider is a strong two-source extractor from Dodis et al. [9], which
requires both sources together to have at least n bits of entropy.
I Lemma 20 ([9]). For any n1 = n2 = n, k1, k2 and m there exists an explicit function
Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m that is a (k1, k2, ε) two-source extractor, strong in both X1
and in X2 (separately), with ε = 2−(k1+k2+1−n−m)/2.
To have an error ε < 1, the total entropy must be k1 + k2 > n − 1. The difference
between k1 + k2 and n − 1 can either be extracted or used to decrease the error. Let
`+m = k1 + k2 + 1− n, then the error is ε = 2−`/2.
Plugging Lemma 20 into Theorem 2 we get the following.
I Corollary 21. For any n1 = n2 = n, k′1, k′2 and m there exists an explicit function
Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m that is a (k′1, k′2, ε) two-source extractor, strong in both
sources (separately), with ε′ =
√
3
2 2−(k
′
1+k
′
2+1−n−5m)/8.
Proof. From Theorem 2 we have k′1 = k1+log 1ε and k′2 = k2+log
1
ε . Rewriting the error from
Lemma 20 in terms ofm we getm = k1+k2+1−n−2 log 1ε . Hencem = k′1+k′2+1−n−4 log 1ε ,
so ε = 2−(k′1+k′2+1−n−m)/4. Plugging this in the error from Theorem 2, namely ε′ =
√
3ε2m/2
finishes the proof. J
The parameters in the quantum case are very similar to the classical one. We still need
k′1 + k′2 > n− 1 and the difference can either be extracted or used to decrease the error. But
this time for `+ m˜ = k′1 + k′2 + 1− n the extractor outputs m = m˜/5 bits with error 2−`/8.
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Since the extractor is strong we can compose it with a quantum-proof seeded extractor,
e.g., Trevisan’s extractor [8], to extractor more randomness from the sources – this procedure
is explained in Appendix G. Here we use a variant of Trevisan’s extractor with parameters
given in Lemma 39 in Appendix G.
I Corollary 22. For any n1 = n2 = n, k′1, k′2, ε′, m′′, ε′′, such that
m = k
′
1 + k′2 + 1− n− 8 log(
√
3/2ε′)
5 ≥ d ,
max[k′1, k′2] ≥ m′′ + 4 log
m′′
ε′′
+ 6 ,
where d is the seed length needed by the extractor from Lemma 39, there exists an explicit
function Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m+m′′ that is a quantum-proof (k′1, k′2, ε′ + ε′′)
two-source extractor.
We remark that the construction of Dodis et al. [9] is based on universal hash functions.
These are already known to be good quantum-proof seeded extractors [30, 36, 13]. Recently,
Hayashi and Tsurumaru [13] proved that they are also good quantum-proof extractors if
the seed is not uniform. Using some of our proof techniques, the result of Hayashi and
Tsurumaru can be generalised to obtain a different proof that the construction of Dodis et al.
is a two-source extractor in the Markov model. The resulting parameters are better than
what we obtain here with the generic reduction from quantum-proof to classical extractors,
since the Hayashi-Tsurumaru proof [13] does not have the
√
2m factor.
B.2 One high and one logarithmic entropy source
The following construction by Raz [27] improves on Dodis et al. [9]. One of the sources still
requires at least n/2 bits of entropy, but the other can be logarithmic.
I Lemma 23 ([27, Theorem 1]). For any n1, n2, k1, k2, m, and any 0 < δ < 1/2, such that,
n1 ≥ 6 logn1 + 2 logn2,
k1 ≥
(
1
2 + δ
)
n1 + 3 logn1 + logn2,
k2 ≥ 5 log(n1 − k1),
m ≤ δmin
[
n1
8 ,
k2
40
]
− 1,
there exists an explicit function Ext : {0, 1}n1 × {0, 1}n2 → {0, 1}m that is a (k1, k2, ε)-two-
source extractor strong in both inputs (separately) with ε = 2−3m/2.
Plugging this into Theorem 2 we get the following.
I Corollary 24. For any n1, n2, k′1, k′2, m, and 0 < δ′ < 19/32, such that,
n1 ≥ 6 logn1 + 2 logn2,
k′1 ≥
(
1
2 + δ
′
)
n1 + 3 logn1 + logn2,
k′2 ≥
163
32 log
((
1 + 3δ
′
19
)
n1 − k′1
)
,
m ≤ 16δ
′
19 min
[
n1
8 ,
4k′2
163
]
− 1,
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there exists an explicit function Ext : {0, 1}n1 × {0, 1}n2 → {0, 1}m that is a quantum-proof
(k′1, k′2, ε)-two-source extractor strong in both inputs (separately) with ε′ =
√
3
2 2−m/4.
Proof. We need k′1 ≥ k1 + log 1/ε, so we set
k′1 = k1 +
3
2δ
n1
8 ≥
(
1
2 +
19δ
16
)
n1 + 3 logn1 + logn2.
We obtain the bound on k′1 given above by setting δ′ = 19δ/16. Similarly, we need k′2 ≥
k2 + log 1/ε, so we set
k′2 = k2 +
3
2
1
2
k2
40 =
163
160k2 ≥
163
32 log(n1 − k1).
Writing this in terms of k′1 instead of k1 gives the bound on k′2. The bound on m is also
updated in terms of δ′ and k′2. Finally the new error is given by ε′ =
√
3ε2m/2. J
Here too the parameters are very similar to the classical case, only the coefficients change
somewhat. As in Appendix B.1, this extractor is strong, hence we can compose it with
Lemma 39 as explained in Appendix G.
I Corollary 25. For any n1, n2, k′1, k′2, m, and 0 < δ′ < 19/32, satisfying the constraints
from Corollary 24 and any m′′, ε′′ such that
m ≥ d(m′′, ε′′) ,
max[k′1, k′2] ≥ m′′ + 4 log
m′′
ε′′
+ 6 ,
where d – the seed length needed by the extractor from Lemma 39 – is a function of m′′ and ε′′,
there exists an explicit function Ext : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}n → {0, 1}m+m′′ that is a quantum-proof
(k′1, k′2,
√
3
2 2−m/4 + ε′′) two-source extractor.
B.3 Three poly-logarithmic sources
The third extractor we consider can break the barrier of n/2 min-entropy – it is sufficient for
the sources to have k = log12 n bits of entropy – but requires three sources instead of two.
I Lemma 26 ([20, Theorem 1.5]). For any n and k ≥ log12 n, there exists an explicit function
Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m that is a (k, k, k, ε) three-source extractor, strong
in X1 and in X2X3 with m = 0.9k and ε = 2−k
Ω(1) .
Since the error of this extractor is not exponential in k, but only in kc for some c < 1,
when applying it to a source with quantum side information we cannot extract all of the
entropy, but only kc′ bits, for any c′ < c.
I Corollary 27. For any n and k′ ≥ 2 log12 n, there exists an explicit function Ext : {0, 1}n×
{0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m′ that is a quantum-proof (k′, k′, k′, ε′) three-source extractor,
strong in X1 and in X2X3 with m′ = k′Ω(1) and ε′ = 2−k
′Ω(1) .
Proof. Let c be the leading term in Ω(1) for ε = 2−kΩ(1) from Lemma 26. Note that we
necessarily have c < 1, because otherwise for k = n the error would be 2−n+o(n) which is
impossible [25]. We thus get k′ = k + log 1/ε = k + kc + o(kc). Requiring k′ ≥ 2 log12 n is
sufficient to have k ≥ log12 n for large enough k. Picking m′ = kc′ = k′Ω(1) for some c′ < c
implies that ε′ =
√
4ε2m/2 = 2−kΩ(1) = 2−k′Ω(1) . J
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Corollary 27 does not extract as much entropy as Lemma 26, but it extracts enough to
use as a seed in Trevisan’s construction and extract the entropy of the sources X2X3. The
parameters below are obtained by composing Corollary 27 with Lemma 40.
I Corollary 28. There exists a constant c′ such that for any n and k3 ≥ k2 ≥ k1 ≥
max
[
2 log12 n, log3/c
′
n
]
, there exists an explicit function Ext : {0, 1}n ×{0, 1}n ×{0, 1}n →
{0, 1}m that is a quantum-proof (k1, k2, k3, ε) three-source extractor with m = kΩ(1)1 + k2 +
k3 − o(k2 + k3) and ε = n−Ω(1).
Proof. The quantum-proof extractor from Lemma 40 requires a seed of length d = O(log3 n)
for an error ε = n−Ω(1). The output length of Corollary 27 is m′ = kc′1 − o(kc
′
1 ) for some
constant c′. Thus, if kc′1 > log3 n, the output is long enough. J
B.4 Two poly-logarithmic sources
In a recent breakthrough Chattopadhyay and Zuckerman constructed a two-source extractor
that outputs 1 bit and only requires two sources of poly-logarithmic entropy [5]. This was
then generalised to multiple output bits by Li [18].
I Lemma 29 ([18, Theorem 1.3]). There exists a constant c1 such that for any n and
k ≥ logc1 n, there exists an explicit function Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m that is a
(k, k, ε) two-source extractor strong in X2 with m = kΩ(1) and ε = n−Ω(1).
Since the error of this extractor is only polynomial in 1/n, the quantum-proof version
can only produce an output of length m′ = Ω(logn). The constant hidden in m = Ω(logn)
depends on the constant in ε = n−Ω(1). However, Lemma 29 allows the error to be n−c2 for
any constant c2 [19], which means that m′ = c3 logn for any c3.
I Corollary 30. There exists a constant c′1 such that for any n and k′ ≥ logc
′
1 n, there exists
an explicit function Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m′ that is a quantum-proof (k′, k′, ε′)
two-source extractor strong in X2 with ε′ = n−Ω(1) and m′ = c3 logn for any constant c3 > 0
and sufficiently large n.
Proof. Since for Lemma 29 we have ε = n−c2 for any c2, we set m′ = c22 logn, hence
ε′ =
√
3ε2m′/2 = n−Ω(1). The difference between k′ and k is absorbed in the constant c′1. J
This extractor is strong in the second input, hence as previously we can extract the entropy
of this source using Trevisan’s extractor. However, since the output is only m′ = c3 logn, we
compose it with a variant of Trevisan’s extractor that only needs a seed of length O(logn),
but requires the source to have entropy k = nα for some constant 0 < α ≤ 1 and extracts kβ
bits for any 0 < β < 1. This extractor is given in Lemma 41. The result given here below
allows one of the sources to still have poly-logarithmic entropy, but requires the other to
have k = nα bits of min-entropy.
I Corollary 31. There exists a constant c′1 such that for any 0 < α ≤ 1, 0 < β < 1, n,
k1 ≥ logc
′
1 n and k2 ≥ nα there exists an explicit function Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m′′
that is a quantum-proof (k1, k2, ε′′) two-source extractor with ε′′ = n−Ω(1) and m′′ = kβ2 .
C The quantum Markov model in quantum randomness amplification
protocols
Recently, the interest in quantum-proof two-source extractors (and multi-source in general)
was renewed as people wished to use them as part of quantum randomness amplification
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(QRA) protocols. As for randomness extractors, the goal of a QRA protocol is to extract
an almost uniformly random string from a weak source (which is usually known in public,
e.g., NIST’s Randomness Beacon). However, in contrast to randomness extractors, the idea
is to do it with only one weak source (and no seed) by exploiting the power of quantum
physics (as mentioned in Section 1 this is impossible in the case of randomness extractors).
Of course, once a quantum protocol is considered, it only makes sense to consider quantum
side information.
With particular importance are QRA protocols which are device independent. That is,
protocols in which one treats the devices as black boxes and does not assume much regarding
the underlying quantum states and measurements inside the boxes9. One should then prove
the security of the protocol only based on the statistics which are observed by the honest
user when running the protocol. This seemly impossible task is made possible by the use of
Bell inequalities, which allow one to “certify the quantumness” of the considered protocol
(for a review on the topic see, e.g., [32]).
In the past couple of years several protocols were suggested for this task. The result
presented in [7] was a big breakthrough: they considered a QRA protocol which uses a
polynomial (at best) number of devices and a security proof against a general quantum
adversary was proven. The main disadvantage of the protocol given in [7] for actual
implementations is the number of devices; each device can be thought of as a separate
computer (or actually a complete laboratory where a Bell violation experiment can be done)
and for the protocol to work one must make sure that the different computers cannot send
signals to one another. Hence, a large number of devices amounts to a huge impractical
apparatus. It is therefore interesting to ask whether a QRA protocol with a constant number
of devices exists, or under which assumptions on the devices it is possible to devise such a
protocol which can also be implemented in practice.
Several other works considered the question of QRA with a constant number of devices,
e.g., [4, 22, 24]. The general idea in those works was to create two independent weak random
sources from devices (under different additional setup assumptions not made in [7]) that
violate some Bell inequality, and then to apply a two-source extractor to get a final uniform
key. However, as two-source extractors are not secure against general quantum adversaries
the security was compromised. Indeed, [22, 24] for example did not give a complete security
proof against quantum adversaries. In [4] security was proven10 by a reduction to the case
of a simple classical adversary (and hence the extractor could be used), at the cost of an
additional setup assumption, namely that the adversary never has access to the initial weak
source, and some loss in parameters.
Following the current work about quantum-proof multi-source extractors it is therefore
interesting to consider the Markov model in the context of QRA protocols. More specifically,
one can assume that two (or more) separated devices are a priori in product and become
correlated only via the adversary or the environment, i.e., the state of the devices and the
adversary ρABC is a Markov chain A↔ C ↔ B. The (unknown but local) measurements
in the two devices then create a ccq-state ρX1X2C in the Markov model, to which the
quantum-proof two-source extractor is applied.
9 The advantage of this approach is that this stronger notion of security allows for some inevitable
unknown imperfections in actual implementations of the protocol.
10The security proof of [4] holds against non-signalling adversaries, which are more powerful than quantum
ones. Note that two-source extractors are not known to be secure against those more powerful non-
signalling adversaries (in any model of the sources and the side information). Furthermore, our proof
technique that shows security in specific quantum models cannot be used in the non-signalling case.
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Such assumptions about the structure of the devices could be justified in an intermediate
device independent manner, e.g., if the devices are produced by two different experimental
groups, or if the experimentalists know that a priori the devices are in a product state but
might get correlated since they are placed in near by locations and therefore effected from
the same temperature fluctuations. In any case, we still consider one quantum adversary
and do not restrict her side information to some leakage operation as in [6]. Furthermore,
it is well known that for many Bell inequalities, if the observed Bell violation in the QRA
protocol is maximal then the devices must be in product with one another (i.e., one does not
need to assume that this is the case). Taking into account self-testing results like [28, 40],
although out of reach of current techniques, it is possible that in the future one could justify
an almost tensor product structure (in some appropriate notion of closeness under which the
extractors still perform well) from a non-maximal observed Bell violation.
D Proofs of Section 4
I Lemma 11. Let ρX1X2C =
∑
x1,x2
|x1〉〈x1| ⊗ |x2〉〈x2|ρC(x1, x2). Then there exists a pure
state ρABC and POVMs {Fx1}, {Gx2} such that
ρC(x1, x2) = TrAB
[
F
1
2
x1 ⊗G
1
2
x2 ⊗ 1CρABCF
1
2
x1 ⊗G
1
2
x2 ⊗ 1C
]
.
Proof. Let ρX1X2C =
∑
x1,x2
px1,x2 |x1〉〈x1|X1⊗|x2〉〈x2|X2⊗ρ˜x1,x2C , where ρ˜x1,x2C = ρC(x1,x2)TrρC(x1,x2) .
And let |ψx1,x2〉RC be a purification of ρ˜x1,x2C . We define
|ρ〉ABC =
∑
x1,x2
√
px1,x2 |x1〉X1 ⊗ |x2〉X2 ⊗ |ψx1,x2〉RC
with A = X1 and B = X2R. One can easily verify that this lemma holds for Fx1 = |x1〉〈x1|
and Gx2 = |x2〉〈x2| ⊗ 1R. J
I Lemma 13. For any ΨABC1C2 and positive operators {Fx1}, {Gx2}, {Hz1}, {Kz2} which
sum up to the identity,∑
x1,x2,
z1,z2,y
[
δExt(x1,x2)=y −
1
M
] [
δExt(z1,z2)=y −
1
M
]
Tr [ΨABC1C2Fx1 ⊗Gx2 ⊗Hz1 ⊗Kz2 ]
=
∑
x1,x2,z1,z2|
Ext(x1,x2)=Ext(z1,z2)
Tr [ΨABC1C2Fx1 ⊗Gx2 ⊗Hz1 ⊗Kz2 ]−
1
M
Proof. Let p(x1, x2, z1, z2) = Tr [ΨABC1C2Fx1 ⊗Gx2 ⊗Hz1 ⊗Kz2 ]. We consider each of the
terms of the LHS of the equation separately:∑
x1,x2,
z1,z2,y
δExt(x1,x2)=yδExt(z1,z2)=y p(x1, x2, z1, z2) =
∑
x1,x2,z1,z2|
Ext(x1,x2)=Ext(z1,z2)
p(x1, x2, z1, z2) ;
1
M
∑
x1,x2,
z1,z2,y
δExt(x1,x2)=y p(x1, x2, z1, z2) =
1
M
;
1
M
∑
x1,x2,
z1,z2,y
δExt(z1,z2)=y p(x1, x2, z1, z2) =
1
M
;
1
M2
∑
x1,x2,
z1,z2,y
p(x1, x2, z1, z2) =
1
M
.
The lemma follows by combining all the terms. J
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In the following we denote [l] \ {i} by i¯ and [l] \ {i, j} by {i, j}.
I Lemma 32. Let ρA[l]C be such that for all i ∈ [l],
I(Ai : Ai¯|C) = 0 .
Then ρA[l]C can be written as a direct sum of product states,
ρA[l]C =
⊕
t
p(t)ρtA1Ct1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρ
t
AlCtl
,
where HC =
⊕
tHCt1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ HCtl .
Proof. We prove this lemmas by recursively applying the result from [14] given in Equa-
tion (12) on the structure of quantum Markov chains. We will also use the following facts
about conditional mutual information:
1. For any ρABC , I(A : B|C) ≥ 0.
2. For any ρABCD, I(A : BC|D) ≥ I(A : B|D).
3. For any ρABCX =
∑
x pxρ
x
ABC ⊗ |x〉〈x| classical on X, I(A : B|CX) =
∑
x pxI(A :
B|CX = x).
Because I(A1 : A1¯|C) = 0, we know that
ρA[l]C =
⊕
t1
pt1ρ
t1
A1C
t1
1
⊗ ρt1
A1¯C
t1
1¯
.
Let T1 denote a classical system defined by
ρA[l]CT1 =
⊕
t1
pt1ρ
t1
A1C
t1
1
⊗ ρt1
A1¯C
t1
1¯
⊗ |t1〉〈t1| .
Note that ρA[l]CT1 is related to ρA[l]C by an isometry from C to CT1, hence
I(A2 : A2¯|CT1) = I(A2 : A2¯|C) = 0 .
It follows that for all t1,
I(A2 : A2¯|CT1 = t1) = 0 ,
and hence
I(A2 : A{1,2}|CT1 = t1) = 0 ,
which means that the state ρt1A2A{1,2}Ct1 is a Markov chain A2 ↔ C
t1 ↔ A{1,2}. Applying
Equation (12) again, we get
ρt1A2A{1,2}C
t1 =
⊕
t2
pt2ρ
t1,t2
A2C
t1,t2
2
⊗ ρt1,t2
A{1,2}C
t1,t2
{1,2}
.
Repeating this for all i ∈ [l] proves the lemma. J
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E Strong extractors
In this section we give the proofs necessary for the security of quantum-proof two-source
extractors, strong in the source X1, against product side information. The same steps can be
repeated to prove the same result for multi-source extractors which are strong with respect
to other sources.
The following lemma is the analogues of Lemma 12 for the strong case.
I Lemma 33. Let ρX1X2C = ρX1C1 ⊗ ρX2C2 be a product ccq-state. Then there exists a
POVM {Gz2} acting on C2 such that
1
M
‖ρExt(X1,X2)X1C − ρUm ⊗ ρX1C‖2 ≤∑
x1,x2,
z2,y
[
δExt(x1,x2)=y −
1
M
] [
δExt(x1,z2)=y −
1
M
]
P[X1 = x1] TrC2 [ρC2(x2)Gz2 ] ,
where M = 2m.
Proof. First, recall that for a hermitian matrix R we have ‖R‖ = max{Tr[RS] : −1 ≤ S ≤
1}. Applying this to the matrix which norm specifies the error of the extractor, we find
‖ρExt(X1,X2)C − ρUm ⊗ ρC‖ = max−1≤S≤1Tr
[(
ρExt(X1,X2)C − ρUm ⊗ ρC
)
S
]
.
Since ρExt(X1,X2)X1C and ρUm⊗ρX1C are block diagonal with respect to the outcome variable
of the extractor y, as well as to the classical variable x1, S can be assumed to be block
diagonal as well. Using this and inserting the expression for ρX1X2C in Equation (7) we
arrive at
‖ρExt(X1,X2)X1C − ρUm ⊗ ρX1C‖ =
max
−1≤Sy,x1≤1
∑
y,x1,x2
[
δExt(x1,x2)=y −
1
M
]
Tr [ρC1(x1)⊗ ρC2(x2)Sx1,y] .
Let us denote Gx2 = ρ¯
− 12
C2
ρC2(x2)ρ¯
− 12
C2
with ρ¯C2 =
∑
x2
ρC2(x2). Then we find
‖ρExt(X1,X2)X1C − ρUm ⊗ ρX1C‖
= max
−1≤Sy,x1≤1
∑
y,x1,x2
[
δExt(x1,x2)=y −
1
M
]
· Tr
[
(ρC1(x1)⊗ ρ¯C2)
1
2 1C1 ⊗Gx2 (ρC1(x1)⊗ ρ¯C2)
1
2 Sx1,y
]
= max
−1≤Sy,x1≤1
∑
y,x1
Tr
[
(ρC1(x1)⊗ ρ¯C2)
1
2 1C1 ⊗∆x1,y (ρC1(x1)⊗ ρ¯C2)
1
2 Sx1,y
]
where we used the abbreviation
∆y,x1 =
∑
x2
[
δExt(x1,x2)=y −
1
M
]
Gx2 .
We now denote
ρX1C1 =
∑
x1
|x1〉〈x1| ⊗ ρC1(x1)
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and find ρ
1
2
X1C1
=
∑
x1
|x1〉〈x1| ⊗ ρC1(x1)
1
2 . Setting
∆y =
∑
x1
|x1〉〈x1| ⊗ 1C1 ⊗∆y,x1 , Sy =
∑
x1
|x1〉〈x1| ⊗ Sy,x1
we find
‖ρExt(X1,X2)X1C − ρUm ⊗ ρX1C‖ = max−1≤Sy≤1
∑
y
Tr
[
ρ
1
2
X1C1
⊗ ρ¯ 12C2∆yρ
1
2
X1C1
⊗ ρ¯ 12C2Sy
]
.
The crucial observation is now that the sesquilinear form
(Ry)× (Ty) 7→
∑
y
Tr
[
(ρX1C1 ⊗ ρ¯C2)
1
2 R∗y (ρX1C1 ⊗ ρ¯C2)
1
2 Ty
]
on block-diagonal matrices is positive semi-definite and hence fulfils the Cauchy-Schwarz
inequality. Applying this gives
‖ρExt(X1,X2)X1C − ρUm ⊗ ρX1C‖2 ≤
(∑
y
Tr
[
(ρX1C1 ⊗ ρ¯C2)
1
2 ∆y (ρX1C1 ⊗ ρ¯C2)
1
2 ∆y
])
·
(∑
y
Tr
[
(ρX1C1 ⊗ ρ¯C2)
1
2 Sy (ρX1C1 ⊗ ρ¯C2)
1
2 Sy
])
.
Since we have that the norm of Sy is bounded by one, the terms in the second sum satisfy
Tr
[
(ρX1C1 ⊗ ρ¯C2)
1
2 Sy (ρX1C1 ⊗ ρ¯C2)
1
2 Sy
]
≤ Tr [ρX1C1 ⊗ ρ¯C2Sy] ≤ 1 .
Hence we arrive at
‖ρExt(X1,X2)X1C − ρUm ⊗ ρX1C‖ ≤
√
M
∑
y
Tr
[
(ρX1C1 ⊗ ρ¯C2)
1
2 ∆y (ρX1C1 ⊗ ρ¯C2)
1
2 ∆y
]
and expanding the definition of ∆y yields
‖ρExt(X1,X2)X1C − ρUm ⊗ ρX1C‖ ≤
√
M
∑
y,x1,x2,z2
TrC1 [ρC1(x1)]
[
δExt(x1,x2)=y −
1
M
] [
δExt(x1,z2)=y −
1
M
]
Tr [ρC2(x2)Gz2 ] ,
and since Gz2 are positive operators summing up to the identity, the assertion is proven. J
Next, let p(x1, x2, z2) = P[X1 = x1] TrC2 [ρC2(x2)Gz2 ] and note that p(x1, x2, z2) is
indeed a probability distribution. Then, the following lemma is analogues to Lemma 13.
I Lemma 34. For p(x1, x2, z2) = P[X1 = x1] TrC2 [ρC2(x2)Gz2 ],
∑
x1,x2,
z2,y
[
δExt(x1,x2)=y −
1
M
] [
δExt(x1,z2)=y −
1
M
]
p(x1, x2, z2)
=
∑
x1,x2,z2|
Ext(x1,x2)=Ext(x1,z2)
p(x1, x2, z2) − 1
M
(15)
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Proof. We follow a similar line as in the proof of Lemma 13.∑
x1,x2,
z2,y
δExt(x1,x2)=yδExt(x1,z2)=y p(x1, x2, z2) =
∑
x1,x2,z2|
Ext(x1,x2)=Ext(x1,z2)
p(x1, x2, z2) ;
1
M
∑
x1,x2,
z2,y
δExt(x1,x2)=y p(x1, x2, z2) =
1
M
;
1
M
∑
x1,x2,
z2,y
δExt(x1,z2)=y p(x1, x2, z2) =
1
M
;
1
M2
∑
x1,x2,
z2,y
p(x1, x2, z2) =
1
M
. J
The quantity in Equation (15) can be seen as a simple distinguishing strategy of a
distinguisher trying to distinguish the output of the extractor from uniform given classical
side information Z2 about the second source X2 and the source X1. We can therefore
relate it to the error of the strong extractor in the case of classical side information, i.e., to
Equation (2). This is shown in the following lemma, which is analogues to Lemma 14.
I Lemma 35. Let Z2 denote the classical side information about the source X2.11 Then∑
x1,x2,z2|
Ext(x1,x2)=Ext(x1,z2)
p(x1, x2, z2)− 1
M
≤ 12‖Ext (X1, X2)X1Z2 − Um ◦X1Z2‖ .
Proof. Define the following random variables over {0, 1}m × {0, 1}n1 × {0, 1}n2 :
R = Ext(X1, X2)X1Z2 ; Q = Um ◦X1Z2 .
Let A? = {(a1, a2, a3)∣∣a1 = Ext (a2, a3)} ⊆ {0, 1}m × {0, 1}n1 × {0, 1}n2 . Then, the probab-
ilities that R and Q assign to the event A? are
R(A?) =
∑
x1,x2,z2|
Ext(x1,x2)=Ext(x1,z2)
p(x1, x2, z2) ; Q(A?) = 1
M
Using the definition of the variational distance we therefore have
1
2‖Ext(X1, X2)X1Z2 − Um ◦X1Z2‖ = supA ‖R(A)−Q(A)‖
≥ R(A?)−Q(A?)
=
∑
x1,x2,z2|
Ext(x1,x2)=Ext(x1,z2)
p(x1, x2, z2)− 1
M
. J
Finally, we combine the lemmas together to show that any strong classical-proof two-
source extractor in the Markov model is secure against product quantum side information as
well. We follow similar steps to those in the proof of Lemma 15.
11There is no side information about the source X1, since it is made available in full.
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I Lemma 36. Any (k1, k2, ε)-strong classical-proof two-source extractor in the Markov model
is a
(
k1, k2,
√
ε · 2(m−2)
)
-strong quantum-proof product two-source extractor, where m is the
output length of the extractor.
Proof. Let ρX1X2C = ρX1C1 ⊗ ρX2C2 be any state of two classical sources and product side
information with Hmin(X1|C1) ≥ k1 and Hmin(X2|C2) ≥ k2.
We can apply Lemmas 33, 34, and 35 to get the bound
‖ρExt(X1,X2)X1C − ρUm ⊗ ρX1C‖ ≤
√
M
2 ‖Ext (X1, X2)X1Z2 − Um ◦X1Z2‖ . (16)
As it follows from the proofs of the previous lemmas that Z2 includes side information
about X2 alone (and there is no additional side information about X2, i.e., the quantum
system C1 is just thrown away) p(x1, x2, z2) = p(x1) · p(x2, z2), which implies:
1. The sources and the classical side information form a Markov chain X1 ↔ Z2 ↔ X2.
2. Hmin (X1|Z2) = Hmin (X1) ≥ Hmin (X1|C1).
3. Hmin (X2|Z2) ≥ Hmin (X2|C2).
Hence, if Hmin (Xi|Ci) ≥ ki then by the definition of a strong classical-proof two-source
extractor,
1
2‖Ext (X1, X2)X1Z2 − Um ◦X1Z2‖ ≤ ε . (17)
Combining Equations (16) and (17) we get
1
2‖ρExt(X1,X2)X1C − ρUm ⊗ ρX1C‖ ≤
1
2
√
Mε =
√
ε2(m−2) . J
F Extracting from subnormalized states
Extractors are usually defined for normalized states ρX1X2C . In applications one might
wish to extract from subnormalized states – for example, the smooth min-entropy of a state
is a bound on the entropy of a subnormalized state that is close by. Here we prove that
if a function is an extractor (for normalized states), then one can use it to extract from
subnormalized states as well. We write up the lemma and proof in the case of two-source
extractors in the Markov model. Similar statements hold for multiple sources as well as
seeded extractors.
I Lemma 37. Let σX1X2C be a subnormalized Markov state satisfying Hmin(X1|C)σ ≥ k1 as
well as Hmin(X2|C)σ ≥ k2, and let Ext : {0, 1}n1 ×{0, 1}n2 → {0, 1}m be a (k1− 1, k2− 1, ε)
quantum-proof two-source extractor in the Markov model. If Ext is weak, then we have that
1
2‖σExt(X1,X2)C − ρUm ⊗ σC‖ ≤ 2ε .
If Ext is strong in Xi, then we have that
1
2‖σExt(X1,X2)XiC − ρUm ⊗ σXiC‖ ≤ 2ε .
Proof. We prove the weak case. The proof for strong extractors is identical.
Define p = Tr[σC ] and with that the normalized state σˆX1X2C = 1pσX1X2C as well as the
auxiliary normalized state
σ˜X1X2CP = σX1X2C ⊗ |0〉〈0|P + (1− p)τX1X2 ⊗ σˆC ⊗ |1〉〈1|P ,
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where τX1X2 is the fully mixed state. Note that X1 ↔ CP ↔ X2 is a Markov chain for the
state σ˜X1X2CP . This state satisfies slightly modified min-entropy conditions:
pguess(X1|CP )σ˜X1CP = pguess(X1|C)σX1C + (1− p)pguess(X1|C)τX1⊗σˆC
= 2−k1 + (1− p)2−n1 ≤ 2 · 2−k1 .
Hence Hmin(X1|CP )σ˜ ≥ k1 − 1, and the same argument can also be carried out for X2
showing that Hmin(X2|CP )σ˜ ≥ k2 − 1. The state σ˜X1X2CP is thus a valid Markov state
satisfying the min-entropy conditions and hence we have
1
2‖σ˜Ext(X1,X2)CP − ρUm ⊗ σ˜CP ‖ ≤ ε .
But since the partial trace over the P system only decreases the trace distance, we infer that
1
2‖σExt(X1,X2)C − ρUm ⊗ σC + (1− p)τExt(X1,X2) ⊗ σˆC − (1− p)ρUm ⊗ σˆC‖ ≤ ε .
Thus starting from the expression ‖σExt(X1,X2)C−ρUm⊗σC‖ and then adding and subtracting
the term (1 − p)[τExt(X1,X2) ⊗ σˆC − ρUm ⊗ σˆC ] as well as applying the triangle inequality
leaves us with
1
2‖σExt(X1,X2)C − ρUm ⊗ σC‖ ≤ ε+
1− p
2 ‖τExt(X1,X2) ⊗ σˆC − ρUm ⊗ σˆC‖ ≤ 2ε ,
since τX1X2 ⊗ σˆC is a Markov source satisfying the entropic constraints. J
G Composing two-source and seeded extractors
If a multi-source extractor is strong in an input X1, then the output Y is independent from
X1. This can be interpreted as Y containing the entropy from X2; the randomness of X1
served only as a catalyst, but is still contained in that random variable. A very common
technique used to extract that randomness is to use another extractor. Since Y is uniform and
independent from X1, it fulfils the conditions needed to use it as a seed in seeded extractor.
This is formalised in the following lemma.
I Lemma 38. Let Ext : {0, 1}n1 × {0, 1}n2 → {0, 1}d be a quantum-proof (k1, k2, ε)-two-
source extractor strong in the first input. And let Ext′ : {0, 1}n1 × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m be a
quantum-proof (k1, ε′)-seeded extractor. Then the function
Ext′′ : {0, 1}n1 × {0, 1}n2 → {0, 1}m
(x1, x2) 7→ Ext′(x1,Ext(x1, x2)),
is a quantum-proof (k1, k2, ε+ ε′)-two-source extractor.
Proof. Let ρUdX1C = ρUd ⊗ ρX1C , where ρUd is a fully mixed state of dimension 2d. And let
ρExt′(X1,Ud)C denote the state resulting from applying Ext
′ to X1 with Ud as seed. From the
triangle inequality and contractivity of the trace distance we have
1
2‖ρExt′(X1,Ext(X1,X2))C − ρUm ⊗ ρC‖
≤ 12‖ρExt′(X1,Ext(X1,X2))C − ρExt′(X1,Ud)C‖+
1
2‖ρExt′(X1,Ud)C − ρUm ⊗ ρC‖
≤ 12‖ρExt(X1,X2)X1C − ρUd ⊗ ρX1C‖+
1
2‖ρExt′(X1,Ud)C − ρUm ⊗ ρC‖ .
The first term above is the error of Ext and the second is the error of Ext′. J
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Note that Lemma 38 only requires a weak seeded extractor. Hence if a strong extractor
is used, the seed can additionally be appended to the output – this is the case for all the
following extractors.
Here below we give several seeded quantum-proof extractor constructions – all variants
of Trevisan’s extractor – that we use in the explicit constructions from Appendix B.
The first construction [8, Corollary 5.3] is one for which the exact parameters have been
calculated [21].
I Lemma 39 ([8, Corollary 5.3],[21]). There exists an explicit function Ext : {0, 1}n ×
{0, 1}d → {0, 1}m, which is a quantum-proof (k, ε)-strong extractor with
t = 2 log 2nm
2
ε2
,
a = 1 + max
{
0, log(m− e)− log(t− e)log e− log(e− 1)
}
,
k = m+ 4 log m
ε
+ 6 ,
d = at2 ,
where e is the mathematical constant.
The entropy loss of this extractor, k −m = 4 log mε + 6, can be reduced by composing it
with an almost universal hash function [36].
I Lemma 40 ([8, Corollary 5.4]). There exists an explicit function Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d →
{0, 1}m, which is a quantum-proof (k, ε)-strong extractor with k = m+ 4 log 1ε +O(1) and
d = O(log2 nε logm).
For ε = n−Ω(1) in Lemma 40 we get d = O(log3 n).
The final construction we consider only requires a seed of length O(logn), but can only
extract a sublinear amount of entropy.
I Lemma 41 ([8, Corollary 5.6]). For any constant 0 < γ < 1 there exists an explicit function
Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m, which is a quantum-proof (k, ε)-strong extractor with
k = nγm+ 8 log mε +O(1), d = O(logn) and ε = n−Ω(1).
For example, if k = nα in Lemma 41 for γ < α ≤ 1, then m = nα−γ − o(1) = k1− γα − o(1).
